GHSA-3244-J874-RHC2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 19:01 – Updated: 2026-06-12 19:27Summary
An attacker can cause DoS by sending a crafted Redis payload with deeply nested arrays. This forces the server to allocate a massive number of state objects and collections, leading to memory exhaustion and an OutOfMemoryError.
Details
io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisArrayAggregator aggregates RedisMessage parts into ArrayRedisMessage. It uses a Deque<AggregateState> to keep track of nested arrays. However, it does not limit the maximum depth of nested arrays. When an attacker sends a continuous stream of nested array headers (e.g., *1\r\n*1\r\n*1\r\n...), RedisArrayAggregator pushes a new AggregateState onto the stack and allocates a new ArrayList for each header. Because there is no depth limit, an attacker can send millions of such headers. This consumes a massive amount of heap memory for the AggregateState instances and their backing ArrayLists, eventually resulting in an OutOfMemoryError.
Impact
Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty's RedisArrayAggregator to handle untrusted Redis traffic is vulnerable.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.14.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-redis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.15.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.134.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-redis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.135.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44250"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T19:01:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T22:16:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn attacker can cause DoS by sending a crafted Redis payload with deeply nested arrays. This forces the server to allocate a massive number of state objects and collections, leading to memory exhaustion and an OutOfMemoryError.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisArrayAggregator aggregates RedisMessage parts into ArrayRedisMessage. It uses a `Deque\u003cAggregateState\u003e` to keep track of nested arrays. However, it does not limit the maximum depth of nested arrays. When an attacker sends a continuous stream of nested array headers (e.g., `*1\\r\\n*1\\r\\n*1\\r\\n...`), RedisArrayAggregator pushes a `new AggregateState` onto the stack and allocates a `new ArrayList` for each header. Because there is no depth limit, an attacker can send millions of such headers. This consumes a massive amount of heap memory for the AggregateState instances and their backing ArrayLists, eventually resulting in an OutOfMemoryError.\n\n### Impact\nDenial of Service due to memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty\u0027s RedisArrayAggregator to handle untrusted Redis traffic is vulnerable.",
"id": "GHSA-3244-j874-rhc2",
"modified": "2026-06-12T19:27:12Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T19:01:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-3244-j874-rhc2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44250"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty: Memory Exhaustion in RedisArrayAggregator due to Deeply Nested Arrays"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.