oesa-2026-1552
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler
A C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. It's extremely easy to setup. Just include httplib.h file in your code!
Security Fix(es):
cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, when a request handler throws a C++ exception and the application has not registered a custom exception handler via set_exception_handler(), the library catches the exception and writes its message directly into the HTTP response as a header named EXCEPTION_WHAT. This header is sent to whoever made the request, with no authentication check and no special configuration required to trigger it. The behavior is on by default. A developer who does not know to opt in to set_exception_handler() will ship a server that leaks internal exception messages to any client. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28434)
cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, cpp-httplib (httplib.h) does not enforce Server::set_payload_max_length() on the decompressed request body when using HandlerWithContentReader (streaming ContentReader) with Content-Encoding: gzip (or other supported encodings). A small compressed payload can expand beyond the configured payload limit and be processed by the application, enabling a payload size limit bypass and potential denial of service (CPU/memory exhaustion). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28435)
cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.37.0, cpp-httplib uses std::regex (libstdc++) to parse RFC 5987 encoded filename values in multipart Content-Disposition headers. The regex engine in libstdc++ implements backtracking via deep recursion, consuming one stack frame per input character. An attacker can send a single HTTP POST request with a crafted filename parameter that causes uncontrolled stack growth, resulting in a stack overflow (SIGSEGV) that crashes the server process. This issue has been patched in version 0.37.0.(CVE-2026-29076)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"cpp-httplib-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"cpp-httplib-debuginfo-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"cpp-httplib-debugsource-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"cpp-httplib-devel-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"cpp-httplib-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"cpp-httplib-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"cpp-httplib-debuginfo-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"cpp-httplib-debugsource-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"cpp-httplib-devel-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "cpp-httplib",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/cpp-httplib\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.37.0-1.oe2403sp1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "A C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. It\u0026amp;apos;s extremely easy to setup. Just include httplib.h file in your code!\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\ncpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, when a request handler throws a C++ exception and the application has not registered a custom exception handler via set_exception_handler(), the library catches the exception and writes its message directly into the HTTP response as a header named EXCEPTION_WHAT. This header is sent to whoever made the request, with no authentication check and no special configuration required to trigger it. The behavior is on by default. A developer who does not know to opt in to set_exception_handler() will ship a server that leaks internal exception messages to any client. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28434)\n\ncpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, cpp-httplib (httplib.h) does not enforce Server::set_payload_max_length() on the decompressed request body when using HandlerWithContentReader (streaming ContentReader) with Content-Encoding: gzip (or other supported encodings). A small compressed payload can expand beyond the configured payload limit and be processed by the application, enabling a payload size limit bypass and potential denial of service (CPU/memory exhaustion). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28435)\n\ncpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.37.0, cpp-httplib uses std::regex (libstdc++) to parse RFC 5987 encoded filename* values in multipart Content-Disposition headers. The regex engine in libstdc++ implements backtracking via deep recursion, consuming one stack frame per input character. An attacker can send a single HTTP POST request with a crafted filename* parameter that causes uncontrolled stack growth, resulting in a stack overflow (SIGSEGV) that crashes the server process. This issue has been patched in version 0.37.0.(CVE-2026-29076)",
"id": "OESA-2026-1552",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:10:33Z",
"published": "2026-03-15T11:10:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1552"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28434"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28435"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29076"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "cpp-httplib security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-28434",
"CVE-2026-28435",
"CVE-2026-29076"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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