CVE-2026-99288 (GCVE-0-2026-99288)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:19 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:19| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871 , < d69100340b4cae08d40f898f1b601032403f6be6
(git)
Affected: 079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871 , < 8e5172cbd227fae32f3313cba1f3e1b9edb5c4fd (git) Affected: 079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871 , < eb8a2d156f2c1d862fffdfd1b3432bfbcd939879 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
4.4
Unaffected: 0 , < 4.4 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.117 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.63 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3.4 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c",
"net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c",
"net/ipv4/syncookies.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_input.c",
"net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d69100340b4cae08d40f898f1b601032403f6be6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8e5172cbd227fae32f3313cba1f3e1b9edb5c4fd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "eb8a2d156f2c1d862fffdfd1b3432bfbcd939879",
"status": "affected",
"version": "079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c",
"net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c",
"net/ipv4/syncookies.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_input.c",
"net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.4"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.4",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.63",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.4",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.117",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.4",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.63",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.4",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.4",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ninet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookups\n\nTCP established ehash lookups are lockless. The socket caches involved\nuse SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so memory can be reused before an RCU reader\nthat retained its old address has finished.\n\nAfter a tuple match, __inet_lookup_established() and\n__inet6_lookup_established() acquire a reference and repeat the tuple\ncheck. They do not check whether the new object is hashed. If the\naddress is reused for a socket with the same tuple, the lookup can\nacquire a reference to the new object and return it while its nulls node\nis unhashed.\n\nA PoC that drives reuse with a SYN cookie request socket reproduced the\ncrash. The new request socket is unhashed and has a NULL rsk_listener.\nA lookup that had loaded the address of the old request socket acquired\nthe reference published by tcp_get_cookie_sock() and returned the new\nobject. tcp_v4_rcv() then read sk_state through the NULL listener.\n\nThe resulting crash was:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n ...\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 7.3.0-00591-g0e135910deec #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n ...\n RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv+0x44e/0x1280\n ...\n R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000024ca8c0 R12: 0000000000000000\n ...\n CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000103d50004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\n ...\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n ? raw_local_deliver+0xae/0x240\n ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2d/0x180\n ip_local_deliver_finish+0x84/0x100\n ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70\n ip_sublist_rcv+0x12a/0x1d0\n ip_list_rcv+0xfd/0x130\n __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x223/0x250\n netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d2/0x2c0\n ? try_fill_recv+0x39/0x7b0\n napi_complete_done+0x74/0x170\n virtnet_poll+0x445/0x600\n __napi_poll+0x27/0x1e0\n net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3b0\n handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x2c0\n __irq_exit_rcu+0x74/0xd0\n common_interrupt+0x7f/0x90\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n ...\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nAfter taking a reference, check whether the nulls node is unhashed in\nboth IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups. If it is unhashed or the tuple\nno longer matches, drop the reference and restart the lookup.\n\nLookups racing with the TIME_WAIT hashdance, or with a request being\nreplaced by its child, now restart and find the new socket instead of\nreturning the old one.\n\nRequest sockets that were never inserted into ehash can have a nonzero\nrefcount, and a stale lookup can hold a transient reference. Therefore,\nwhen SYN cookie, Fast Open, and request migration paths fail after\nsetting a nonzero refcount, release the references held by those paths\nwith reqsk_put() instead of freeing the request directly."
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T18:19:08.557Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d69100340b4cae08d40f898f1b601032403f6be6"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e5172cbd227fae32f3313cba1f3e1b9edb5c4fd"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb8a2d156f2c1d862fffdfd1b3432bfbcd939879"
}
],
"title": "inet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookups",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99288",
"datePublished": "2026-11-10T18:19:08.557Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.405Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T18:19:08.557Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c",
"net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c",
"net/ipv4/syncookies.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_input.c",
"net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d69100340b4cae08d40f898f1b601032403f6be6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8e5172cbd227fae32f3313cba1f3e1b9edb5c4fd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "eb8a2d156f2c1d862fffdfd1b3432bfbcd939879",
"status": "affected",
"version": "079096f103faca2dd87342cca6f23d4b34da8871",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c",
"net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c",
"net/ipv4/syncookies.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_input.c",
"net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.4"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.4",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.63",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.4",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ninet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookups\n\nTCP established ehash lookups are lockless. The socket caches involved\nuse SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so memory can be reused before an RCU reader\nthat retained its old address has finished.\n\nAfter a tuple match, __inet_lookup_established() and\n__inet6_lookup_established() acquire a reference and repeat the tuple\ncheck. They do not check whether the new object is hashed. If the\naddress is reused for a socket with the same tuple, the lookup can\nacquire a reference to the new object and return it while its nulls node\nis unhashed.\n\nA PoC that drives reuse with a SYN cookie request socket reproduced the\ncrash. The new request socket is unhashed and has a NULL rsk_listener.\nA lookup that had loaded the address of the old request socket acquired\nthe reference published by tcp_get_cookie_sock() and returned the new\nobject. tcp_v4_rcv() then read sk_state through the NULL listener.\n\nThe resulting crash was:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n ...\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 7.3.0-00591-g0e135910deec #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n ...\n RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv+0x44e/0x1280\n ...\n R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000024ca8c0 R12: 0000000000000000\n ...\n CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000103d50004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\n ...\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n ? raw_local_deliver+0xae/0x240\n ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2d/0x180\n ip_local_deliver_finish+0x84/0x100\n ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70\n ip_sublist_rcv+0x12a/0x1d0\n ip_list_rcv+0xfd/0x130\n __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x223/0x250\n netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d2/0x2c0\n ? try_fill_recv+0x39/0x7b0\n napi_complete_done+0x74/0x170\n virtnet_poll+0x445/0x600\n __napi_poll+0x27/0x1e0\n net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3b0\n handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x2c0\n __irq_exit_rcu+0x74/0xd0\n common_interrupt+0x7f/0x90\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n ...\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nAfter taking a reference, check whether the nulls node is unhashed in\nboth IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups. If it is unhashed or the tuple\nno longer matches, drop the reference and restart the lookup.\n\nLookups racing with the TIME_WAIT hashdance, or with a request being\nreplaced by its child, now restart and find the new socket instead of\nreturning the old one.\n\nRequest sockets that were never inserted into ehash can have a nonzero\nrefcount, and a stale lookup can hold a transient reference. Therefore,\nwhen SYN cookie, Fast Open, and request migration paths fail after\nsetting a nonzero refcount, release the references held by those paths\nwith reqsk_put() instead of freeing the request directly."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99288",
"lastModified": "2026-11-10T19:22:32.170",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-10T19:22:32.170",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e5172cbd227fae32f3313cba1f3e1b9edb5c4fd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d69100340b4cae08d40f898f1b601032403f6be6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb8a2d156f2c1d862fffdfd1b3432bfbcd939879"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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