CVE-2026-88823 (GCVE-0-2026-88823)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:15 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:15
VLAI
Title
AES-GCM-SIV AAD Forgery After Zero-length Incremental AAD Update
Summary
Issue summary: The AES-GCM-SIV implementation treats a zero-length Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) update as a reset of all the AAD supplied so far, instead of leaving the AAD unchanged. An application that supplies its AAD in several fragments, one of which is empty, therefore produces or verifies messages whose authentication tag does not cover the AAD supplied before the empty fragment. Impact summary: Data an application intended to authenticate alongside a message is silently left unauthenticated. An attacker can forge the AAD of such a message. CWE: CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step Description: An application passing AAD in multiple chunks of which some have zero length will have the previous AAD chunks effectively unauthenticated. Also, on context re-initialisation, the AAD was not reset, which meant that any AAD accumulated from the previous context usage were also included in the AAD of the new message. The fix makes a zero-length AAD update a no-op and clears any accumulated AAD whenever the context is re-initialised with a key or a nonce. A re-initialisation that only changes parameters keeps the AAD. FIPS impact: no The FIPS modules are not affected, as AES-GCM-SIV is not a FIPS approved algorithm and is implemented only in the default provider, outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
  • CWE-325 - Missing Cryptographic Step
Assigner
openssl CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 78/100 over 48 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
OpenSSL OpenSSL Affected: 4.1.0 , < 4.1.1 (semver)
Affected: 4.0.0 , < 4.0.4 (semver)
Affected: 3.5.0 , < 3.5.10 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-11-10 11:05
Credits
Jérémy Jean (ANSSI) Bhargava Shastry Jonathan Bateman (Rochester Institute of Technology) Daniel Kubec
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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