CVE-2026-95691 (GCVE-0-2026-95691)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:16 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:16- CWE-416 - Use After Free
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"product": "OpenSSL",
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"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Filipe Casal (Trail of Bits)"
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"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Filipe Casal (Trail of Bits)"
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"datePublic": "2026-11-10T11:00:00.000Z",
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"value": "Issue summary: A retransmitted QUIC CRYPTO frame can release packet storage\u003cbr\u003ewhile the TLS record layer retains a direct pointer into that storage causing\u003cbr\u003euse after free.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: A malicious QUIC server can cause a heap-use-after-free read\u003cbr\u003ein the OpenSSL QUIC client. The server can also identify one allocator-adjacent\u003cbr\u003ebyte through the client\u0027s protected Handshake response.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-416: Use After Free\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: During CRYPTO stream processing, a pointer into the first frame\u0027s\u003cbr\u003ememory on the stream is lent to the TLS handshake processing. The memory\u003cbr\u003emust remain stable until it is processed and released. However the processing\u003cbr\u003eof retransmitted CRYPTO frames could release the memory if the retransmitted\u003cbr\u003eframe fully overlapped the existing frame. This then causes use-after-free read\u003cbr\u003ewhen the TLS handshake processing continues.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe use-after-free read can lead to a Denial-of-Service of the client\u003cbr\u003eapplication or a minor leak of information about the heap memory contents\u003cbr\u003ethat might be overwritten with other data, subsequently allocated by\u003cbr\u003ethe application, to the peer.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of\u003cbr\u003ethe OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
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"value": "Issue summary: A retransmitted QUIC CRYPTO frame can release packet storage\nwhile the TLS record layer retains a direct pointer into that storage causing\nuse after free.\n\nImpact summary: A malicious QUIC server can cause a heap-use-after-free read\nin the OpenSSL QUIC client. The server can also identify one allocator-adjacent\nbyte through the client\u0027s protected Handshake response.\n\nCWE: CWE-416: Use After Free\n\nDescription: During CRYPTO stream processing, a pointer into the first frame\u0027s\nmemory on the stream is lent to the TLS handshake processing. The memory\nmust remain stable until it is processed and released. However the processing\nof retransmitted CRYPTO frames could release the memory if the retransmitted\nframe fully overlapped the existing frame. This then causes use-after-free read\nwhen the TLS handshake processing continues.\n\nThe use-after-free read can lead to a Denial-of-Service of the client\napplication or a minor leak of information about the heap memory contents\nthat might be overwritten with other data, subsequently allocated by\nthe application, to the peer.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of\nthe OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
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"content": {
"text": "Low"
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"type": "https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/"
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"description": "CWE-416 Use After Free",
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"shortName": "openssl"
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"references": [
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"name": "OpenSSL Advisory",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261110.txt"
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{
"name": "4.1.1 git commit",
"tags": [
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f6244675833e097c2429a40d1b206d95385bd42f"
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],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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"title": "Retransmitted QUIC CRYPTO Frames Can Cause DoS or One-byte Disclosure",
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"assignerShortName": "openssl",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-95691",
"datePublished": "2026-11-10T18:16:03.752Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-22T14:18:48.635Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T18:16:03.752Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"product": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": "OpenSSL",
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"status": "affected",
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"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"
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"descriptions": [
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"value": "Issue summary: A retransmitted QUIC CRYPTO frame can release packet storage\nwhile the TLS record layer retains a direct pointer into that storage causing\nuse after free.\n\nImpact summary: A malicious QUIC server can cause a heap-use-after-free read\nin the OpenSSL QUIC client. The server can also identify one allocator-adjacent\nbyte through the client\u0027s protected Handshake response.\n\nCWE: CWE-416: Use After Free\n\nDescription: During CRYPTO stream processing, a pointer into the first frame\u0027s\nmemory on the stream is lent to the TLS handshake processing. The memory\nmust remain stable until it is processed and released. However the processing\nof retransmitted CRYPTO frames could release the memory if the retransmitted\nframe fully overlapped the existing frame. This then causes use-after-free read\nwhen the TLS handshake processing continues.\n\nThe use-after-free read can lead to a Denial-of-Service of the client\napplication or a minor leak of information about the heap memory contents\nthat might be overwritten with other data, subsequently allocated by\nthe application, to the peer.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of\nthe OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
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],
"id": "CVE-2026-95691",
"lastModified": "2026-11-10T22:10:04.727",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-10T19:21:39.377",
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"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261110.txt"
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"sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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