Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-90001 (GCVE-0-2026-90001)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 10:33 – Updated: 2026-09-16 14:41

Title

HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the same registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and freeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Serialize the remove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one path releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev under the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path already cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is dropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes ops->hdev == NULL under the lock. Background: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one device reference (hid_get_device()). Two paths can release it: - device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device() -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program; - BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for its own registration. The coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs "if (!hdev) return" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two paths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs prog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as non-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the destroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same reference. The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement is individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the device is simply freed while the transport is still inside hid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory. The fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on both sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock. With the lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal. Unlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of hid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path itself still holds this registration's reference (released only by its own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy traversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal re-check return early without any put. At most one of the two paths releases each registration reference.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd0…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad73…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Linux	Linux	Affected: ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c , < 401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459 (git) Affected: ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c , < c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c (git) Affected: ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c , < bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e (git) Affected: ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c , < 9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0 (git)	guessed
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.11 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.11 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.110 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.51 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.5 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3-rc2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e",
              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
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              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.11"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.11",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.110",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.51",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.110",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.51",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path\n\n__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the\nsame registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and\nfreeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the\nremove/NULL decision under hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one\npath releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops-\u003ehdev\nunder the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path\nalready cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is\ndropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes\nops-\u003ehdev == NULL under the lock.\n\nBackground: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one\ndevice reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:\n\n- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -\u003e hid_bpf_destroy_device()\n  -\u003e __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list\n  under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;\n- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls\n  st_ops-\u003eunreg() -\u003e hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for\n  its own registration.\n\nThe coordination handshake (e-\u003ehdev = NULL on the destroy side vs\n\"if (!hdev) return\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two\npaths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs\nprog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops-\u003ehdev as\nnon-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the\ndestroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same\nreference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement\nis individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the\ndevice is simply freed while the transport is still inside\nhid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.\n\nThe fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on\nboth sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With\nthe lock held, plain reads/writes of ops-\u003ehdev are sufficient; no\nREAD_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.\n\nUnlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops-\u003ehdev at the top of\nhid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path\nitself still holds this registration\u0027s reference (released only by\nits own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy\ntraversal that already cleared ops-\u003ehdev makes the lock-internal\nre-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two\npaths releases each registration reference."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - HID-BPF attach and unreg are reached only through local bpf() syscalls (BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS / BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS). Concurrent hid_destroy_device() is also local (uhid UHID_DESTROY/close or HID teardown), not a network or adjacent-radio packet path.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the TOCTOU race: attach HID-BPF, then concurrently delete the struct_ops map (hid_bpf_unreg) and destroy the HID device (e.g. uhid close). Destroy never took prog_list_lock, so unreg does not block on it and the double-put is reliably hittable.\nPR:L - Loading STRUCT_OPS maps/programs requires CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, which can be delegated via BPF tokens into user namespaces rather than init-namespace root. /dev/uhid is also granted to the seat user on typical desktop systems, so real root is not required.\nUI:N - The attacker creates their own uhid HID device, loads and attaches HID-BPF struct_ops, then races map delete against device destroy in their own processes. No victim action such as plugging in hardware or mounting a filesystem is required.\nS:U - The double-put use-after-free of struct hid_device stays inside the host kernel HID/BPF authority and is a standard local privilege-escalation primitive, not a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary crossing.\nC:H - Double-putting struct hid_device frees it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Use-after-free of this large kobject, which holds driver callbacks and pointers, enables an attacker-controlled kernel memory read primitive.\nI:H - The same use-after-free lets the attacker reclaim the freed hid_device via heap spray and corrupt ll_driver/hiddev function pointers or adjacent heap objects, yielding arbitrary kernel writes and control-flow hijacking.\nA:H - Even without full exploitation, dropping the hid_device refcount to zero while hid_remove_device()/put_device() still run causes a kernel oops, panic, or hang on the subsequent use of freed memory."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:41:17.464Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0"
        }
      ],
      "title": "HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90001",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-16T10:33:12.063Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.780Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:41:17.464Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-90001\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-09-16T11:17:11.700\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-09-16T15:18:23.880\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nHID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path\\n\\n__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the\\nsame registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and\\nfreeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the\\nremove/NULL decision under hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one\\npath releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops-\u003ehdev\\nunder the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path\\nalready cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is\\ndropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes\\nops-\u003ehdev == NULL under the lock.\\n\\nBackground: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one\\ndevice reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:\\n\\n- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -\u003e hid_bpf_destroy_device()\\n  -\u003e __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list\\n  under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;\\n- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls\\n  st_ops-\u003eunreg() -\u003e hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for\\n  its own registration.\\n\\nThe coordination handshake (e-\u003ehdev = NULL on the destroy side vs\\n\\\"if (!hdev) return\\\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two\\npaths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs\\nprog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops-\u003ehdev as\\nnon-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the\\ndestroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same\\nreference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement\\nis individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the\\ndevice is simply freed while the transport is still inside\\nhid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.\\n\\nThe fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on\\nboth sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With\\nthe lock held, plain reads/writes of ops-\u003ehdev are sufficient; no\\nREAD_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.\\n\\nUnlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops-\u003ehdev at the top of\\nhid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path\\nitself still holds this registration\u0027s reference (released only by\\nits own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy\\ntraversal that already cleared ops-\u003ehdev makes the lock-internal\\nre-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two\\npaths releases each registration reference.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c\",\"lessThan\":\"401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c\",\"lessThan\":\"c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c\",\"lessThan\":\"bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c\",\"lessThan\":\"9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"6.11\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"6.11\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.110\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.51\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2.5\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.2.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.3-rc2\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":7.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-90001

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-16 15:18

Severity

7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e
	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.11"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.11",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.110",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.51",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path\n\n__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the\nsame registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and\nfreeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the\nremove/NULL decision under hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one\npath releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops-\u003ehdev\nunder the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path\nalready cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is\ndropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes\nops-\u003ehdev == NULL under the lock.\n\nBackground: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one\ndevice reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:\n\n- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -\u003e hid_bpf_destroy_device()\n  -\u003e __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list\n  under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;\n- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls\n  st_ops-\u003eunreg() -\u003e hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for\n  its own registration.\n\nThe coordination handshake (e-\u003ehdev = NULL on the destroy side vs\n\"if (!hdev) return\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two\npaths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs\nprog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops-\u003ehdev as\nnon-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the\ndestroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same\nreference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement\nis individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the\ndevice is simply freed while the transport is still inside\nhid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.\n\nThe fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on\nboth sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With\nthe lock held, plain reads/writes of ops-\u003ehdev are sufficient; no\nREAD_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.\n\nUnlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops-\u003ehdev at the top of\nhid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path\nitself still holds this registration\u0027s reference (released only by\nits own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy\ntraversal that already cleared ops-\u003ehdev makes the lock-internal\nre-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two\npaths releases each registration reference."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-90001",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-16T15:18:23.880",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-16T11:17:11.700",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}

GHSA-7WPM-8HVH-3RP4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path

__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the same registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and freeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Serialize the remove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one path releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev under the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path already cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is dropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes ops->hdev == NULL under the lock.

Background: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one device reference (hid_get_device()). Two paths can release it:

device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device() -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;
BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for its own registration.

The coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs "if (!hdev) return" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two paths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs prog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as non-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the destroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same reference. The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement is individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the device is simply freed while the transport is still inside hid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.

The fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on both sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock. With the lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.

Unlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of hid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path itself still holds this registration's reference (released only by its own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy traversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal re-check return early without any put. At most one of the two paths releases each registration reference.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90001"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path\n\n__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the\nsame registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and\nfreeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the\nremove/NULL decision under hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one\npath releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops-\u003ehdev\nunder the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path\nalready cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is\ndropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes\nops-\u003ehdev == NULL under the lock.\n\nBackground: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one\ndevice reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:\n\n- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -\u003e hid_bpf_destroy_device()\n  -\u003e __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list\n  under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;\n- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls\n  st_ops-\u003eunreg() -\u003e hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for\n  its own registration.\n\nThe coordination handshake (e-\u003ehdev = NULL on the destroy side vs\n\"if (!hdev) return\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two\npaths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs\nprog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops-\u003ehdev as\nnon-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the\ndestroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same\nreference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement\nis individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the\ndevice is simply freed while the transport is still inside\nhid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.\n\nThe fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on\nboth sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With\nthe lock held, plain reads/writes of ops-\u003ehdev are sufficient; no\nREAD_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.\n\nUnlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops-\u003ehdev at the top of\nhid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path\nitself still holds this registration\u0027s reference (released only by\nits own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy\ntraversal that already cleared ops-\u003ehdev makes the lock-internal\nre-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two\npaths releases each registration reference.",
  "id": "GHSA-7wpm-8hvh-3rp4",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T15:31:06Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90001"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

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Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Action not permitted

CVE-2026-90001 (GCVE-0-2026-90001)

FKIE_CVE-2026-90001

GHSA-7WPM-8HVH-3RP4

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